STAKING SERVICES: TAXONOMY, RISKS
AND REGULATION
by Salvatore Luciano Furnari
S UMMARY : 1. From an old idiom to the pillar of crypto-asset markets. – 2. Definition of staking
services. The reward and sanction mechanism. – 3. Staking taxonomy and ancillary services.
– 4. Risks taxonomy. – 5. Legal and regulatory analysis. – 6. Future evolutions and future
research.
1. From an old idiom to the pillar of crypto-asset markets
The idiom “to put something at stake” originates from medieval English and
intertwines both literal and figurative history. Etymologically, stake began as
Old English staca, meaning a pointed post used for fencing, supporting plants,
tethering animals
1
. By the 16
th
century, the term evolved to signify a wagered
stake—what one risks in bets or games. The phrase “at stake” emerged around
1600, metaphorically indicating something placed in jeopardy as if physically
locked to a stake and thus vulnerable to loss
2
. Hence, to “put something at
stake” historically meant placing it in peril or as a bet—blending the concrete
image of tethering with the abstract risk of losing what is valued.
This linguistic trajectory is particularly instructive when transposed to con-
temporary financial technologies. A system such as blockchain, inherently reli-
ant upon trust and designed as a self-sustaining ecosystem in which the enforce-
ment of traditional legal mechanisms proves arduous, requires its participants
to “put something at stake” in order to mitigate opportunistic or malicious be-
haviours. The idiom thus provides a semantic key to understanding the logic of
staking services: the very “invention” of staking resides in this ancient meta-
phor, operationalized in the digital sphere as the voluntary immobilization of
assets to guarantee honest conduct.
1
Source Etymonline.com.
2
One theory connects this metaphor to bear-baiting events, where beasts were tied to stakes
and bets placed on outcomes, though direct evidence remains limited. Source Theidioms.com.

72 Salvatore Luciano Furnari
At present, staking services
3
constitute one of the foundational pillars of
crypto-asset markets. Although staking is not, in its technical structure, a finan-
cial service as defined by MiFID II or a crypto-asset service as defined by
MiCAR, it nevertheless represents a core operational process upon which the
functioning of crypto-assets markets depends. Its juridical significance there-
fore lies not only in the innovative design of incentive and sanction mechanisms
but also in its role as an indispensable infrastructure for the governance and
sustainability of decentralized ecosystems.
2. Definition of staking services. The reward and sanction mechanism
The function of staking consists precisely in the participation in the valida-
tion activity of a distributed ledger through the setting up of a node
4
. In partic-
ular, in permissionless systems
5
, blockchains adopting the proof-of-stake
3
Literature on staking is widespreading. For legal analysis of staking services, see N.E. GON-
ZALEZ, Does Cryptocurrency Staking Fall Under SEC Jurisdiction?, in Fordham Journal of
Corporate & Financial Law, 27, 2, 2022, 521 ss.; G. ANSIDERI , D. S CHETTINI , Staking in Decen-
tralised Finance: Functional Taxonomy and Regulation, Working Paper, 2025; J.S. HART, Po-
licing Proof-of-Stake Networks: Regulatory Challenges Presented by Staking-as-a-Service Pro-
viders and the Need for a Tailored Regime, in Columbia Science & Technology Law Review, 23,
2021, 192 ss; EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT , Decentralised finance: mapping the challenges to finan-
cial regulation, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department for Economic, Sci-
entific and Quality of Life Policies, Study – PE 740.083, 2023.
For the economic implication, see, above all, K. J OHN , T. R IVERA , F. SALEH , Equilibrium
Staking Levels in a Proof-of-Stake Blockchain, SSRN Working Paper, 2021; P. HE , D. TANG, J.
W ANG, Staking Pool Centralization in Proof-of-Stake Blockchain Network, SSRN Working Pa-
per, 2020; D. KRAUSE, Exploring Ethereum Staking: Mechanics, Yields, and Future Prospects,
in International Journal of Cryptocurrency Research, 2024, 4(2), 163-174; S. CARRE, F. GA-
BRIEL, Liquid Staking: When Does It Help?, SSRN Working Paper, 2024; S. S CHARNOWSKI, H.
J AHANSHAHLOO , The Economics of Liquid Staking Derivatives: Basis Determinants and Price
Discovery, SSRN Working Paper, 2024; L.W. CONG, Z. HE , K. TANG, The Tokenomics of Stak-
ing, SSRN Working Paper, 2022; C. ALEXANDER , Leveraged Restaking of Leveraged Staking:
What Are the Risks?, SSRN Working Paper, 2024; M. LEHMANN , F. KRYSA , E. P RÉVOST , F.
S CHINERL , R. VOGELAUER , Staking Your Crypto: What Are the Stakes?, in J. Bus. & Tech. L.,
2023, 19, ss.
4
It is technical operation whereby a participant installs and configures the necessary software
and hardware to connect to the distributed ledger network. A node functions as an active point
of the network’s infrastructure: it stores a copy of the ledger, verifies the validity of incoming
transactions, and—if designated as a validator—participates in the consensus mechanism by
proposing or confirming new blocks.
5
F. BASSAN , M. RABITTI, Recenti evoluzioni dei contratti sulla blockchain. Dagli smart legal
contracts ai ‘contracts on chain’, in Riv. dir. banc., III, 2023, 561-639.

Staking services: taxonomy, risks and regulation 73
(“PoS”) consensus mechanism
6
allow users, without the need for centralized
authorization, to participate directly in sustaining the security and functionality
of the network. This open architecture is a key feature of blockchain govern-
ance, as it democratizes participation while simultaneously embedding respon-
sibility through the staking requirement.
According to the above, the process of staking may be defined as the process
by which crypto-assets are immobilized (put at stake) within a validator node,
thereby enabling participation in the validation of transactions in blockchains
adopting the PoS consensus mechanism
7
.
In particular, most protocols require that staked assets remain immobilized
for a predefined period, commonly referred to as the “bonding period”. During
this interval, the withdrawal of assets from the staking mechanism entails the
ineligibility of the validator to receive further rewards, thereby reinforcing the
commitment to active and continuous participation.
Within this framework, the immobilization of users’ crypto-assets (that are
“put at stake”) operates as an ex ante incentive to act honestly and in accordance
with network rules. Indeed, in an ecosystem developed following the motto
“code is law”, validators need, on the one hand, economic incentive to act hon-
estly and efficiently but, on the other, sanctions in order to avoid dishonest or
negligent conduct. So, the essence of staking services can be understood con-
sidering the two sides of any incentive mechanism: rewards and sanctions.
From the reward side, rewards generally take two forms: (i) the allocation of
newly minted tokens
8
; and (ii) a share of transaction fees paid within the
6
In order for a blockchain to function, there is the need that validator nodes reach consensus
on the “state” of the blockchain. Such state comprises a dynamic set of data, including the record
of addresses, balances, transactions, smart-contract codes, and other protocol-relevant infor-
mation. PoS consesus mechanism is the evolution of Prof-of-Work (PoW) consensus mecha-
nism. In Proof of Work (PoW), instead of selecting validators based on the amount of crypto-
assets locked as collateral, the network relies on computational effort and energy consumption
to validate transactions, making attacks costly. From this perspective, PoS is considered less
environmentally burdensome than PoW.
7
For a similar definition, please see FINMA, Guidance 08/2023, Staking, of December
2023, stating “FINMA regards staking as the process of blocking native cryptoassets at the
staking address of a validator node in order to participate in a blockchain validation process
based on a proof-of-stake consensus mechanism. Participants earn rewards for staking cryp-
toassets”.
8
The distribution of newly minted tokens constitutes the primary mechanism by which most
blockchain protocols incentivise validation activity. In legal-economic terms, this practice can
be regarded as a form of endogenous “issuance” or “seigniorage” within the system, whereby
the protocol autonomously creates additional units of the crypto-asset and assigns them to vali-
dators. This mechanism ensures a predictable stream of remuneration independent of the current
level of network activity, yet it also raises questions concerning the monetary policy of the

74 Salvatore Luciano Furnari
network
9
. From a systemic perspective, these rewards are not merely economic
incentives but also economic instruments aimed at aligning individual interests
with the collective interest in maintaining network integrity. The rewards (to-
gether with the probability to be chosen for validating a specific transaction) are
usually in proportion with the amount of crypto-asset staked within a node.
But it is from the sanction side that staking took its name. Indeed, when
crypto-assets are staked within a node, they are also exposed to a menace poten-
tial loss, in case of misconduct. The locking of crypto-assets subjects them to a
regime of potential forfeiture, commonly referred to as slashing. This mecha-
nism is designed to enforce honest behaviour by validators: where a node en-
gages in misconduct—whether by validating fraudulent transactions, remaining
offline for prolonged periods, or attempting to manipulate consensus—the pro-
tocol may automatically confiscate part or all of the staked assets. From an eco-
nomic standpoint, slashing transforms staking into a high-stakes contractual
commitment, where the validator’s financial exposure guarantees the integrity
of the network. From a legal perspective, this feature raises delicate issues, such
as whether the forfeiture of assets should be construed as a contractual penalty,
a liquidated damage clause
10
, or a sui generis disciplinary measure inherent to
the protocol’s governance structure. From this point of view, staking embeds a
self-enforcing mechanism of compliance in a setting where the recourse to tra-
ditional legal enforcement proves structurally limited.
3. Staking taxonomy and ancillary services
Staking services may be classified into three main categories, each charac-
terized by a different allocation of responsibilities and control over the staked
protocol, the inflationary impact on existing holders, and the potential qualification of such re-
wards as a form of consideration for services rendered under financial or tax law.
9
The allocation of transaction fees, by contrast, represents a remuneration mechanism
grounded not in new issuance but in the redistribution of value already circulating within the net-
work. Every user submitting a transaction pays a fee, which is collected by validators as part of
their compensation. This model ties the validator’s reward to the actual level of network usage and
therefore creates a direct economic link between protocol adoption and validator incentives. From
a legal perspective, transaction-fee rewards may be more readily comparable to remuneration for
the provision of infrastructural services, since no alteration of the asset’s supply occurs; neverthe-
less, they still pose interpretative challenges with respect to their regulatory classification, particu-
larly when combined with other incentive mechanisms such as token issuance or staking yields.
10
Although these two possible qualifications have been mentioned, given the decentralised
nature of the protocol and the absence of any entity responsible for its operation, it appears dif-
ficult to conceive of a contractual relationship between the user and the protocol.

Staking services: taxonomy, risks and regulation 75
assets. In particular, it is possible to distinguish between: (i) solo staking; (ii)
delegated (non-custodial) staking; and (iii) custodial staking.
In the first category it is possible to include the activity carried out directly
by the asset holder, who participates autonomously in the validation process by
setting up the node by himself and staking his own crypto-assets. The solo stak-
ing model is conceptually the most straightforward, as it presupposes no reli-
ance on third parties and thus no intermediation risks.
In delegated (non-custodial) staking, the holder participates in validation ac-
tivities through the intermediation of another subject, but without transferring
control of the crypto-assets to such intermediary
11
. The core element here is the
granting of validation rights absent any transfer of custody, which makes this
model particularly relevant from a regulatory standpoint, as it raises questions
of qualification under contractual law of the relation between the asset holder
and the intermediary but not necessarily under financial regulation (as will be
discussed infra).
In particular, the offering of delegated (non-custodial) staking services finds
its ratio on the fact that, as described above, the participation in the validation
activities presupposes the establishment of a node, a process that may entail
considerable technical complexity and economic cost, rendering it impractical
for ordinary users. This activity, indeed, implies both a technological commit-
ment (maintaining adequate computational resources, internet connectivity, and
security measures) and an economic commitment (locking the required amount
of crypto-assets as collateral, an amount that could be considerable for a non-
professional user
12
). To reduce such transaction costs, third-party operators of-
fer so-called validator-as-a-service solutions: they set up and maintain the node
infrastructure while receiving from other users a delegation of staking rights
without ever obtaining control of their private keys. In consideration for this
activity, the third-party validator retains a service fee, while the asset holder
continues to benefit from staking rewards. This contractual arrangement has
become central in the dissemination of staking, as it lowers the barriers to entry
and democratizes participation.
The third category is called custodial staking. Here, the user relies upon an
intermediary, not only for the exercise of validation rights, but also for the cus-
tody of the crypto-assets. In such cases, the intermediary performs a dual role:
11
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in its “Statement on Certain Pro-
tocol Staking Activities” of 29 May 2025, has described this category as involving a “Node Val-
idator that is granted validation rights from crypto-asset owners”.
12
To activate a validator node on Ethereum, a deposit of 32 ETH is required. Given the cur-
rent market value of one ETH is approximately €3,500-€3,550, the total cost in euros amounts
to about €112,000-€113,500.

76 Salvatore Luciano Furnari
(i) validator on behalf of the owner, and (ii) custodian of the owner’s crypto-
assets. The inclusion of custody services constitutes a material distinction from
non-custodial delegation, as custody of digital assets is frequently subject to
specific regulatory frameworks. Under MiCAR, for instance, the provision of
custody services will trigger licensing obligations and investor protection re-
quirements.
While solo staking is relatively unambiguous, both delegated and custodial
staking share the common feature of intermediation. It therefore becomes cru-
cial, from a legal-regulatory perspective, to identify precisely which services the
intermediary provides. Indeed, this distinction determines whether the activity
falls within the scope of regulated services under applicable legislation (such as
MiCA) or whether it may be considered a non-regulated activity (see infra).
Beyond these categories, certain activities often marketed within the DeFi
environment should not be confused with proper staking services. These include
arrangements that allow holders to earn additional tokens by locking existing
ones, yet without any link to validation of network transactions. Given the ab-
sence of a validation function, it is conceptually accurate to label such practices
as staking-in-name-only (“SINO”). As SINO activities lack the essential char-
acteristic of contributing to consensus and network security.
Beyond their core function, staking service providers often complement their
offering with a series of ancillary services intended to make participation easier,
to reduce risks, or to render staking economically more attractive. One of the
most common examples is slashing coverage, which consists of indemnifica-
tion against losses that may arise when the protocol penalizes a validator
through the partial or total forfeiture of staked assets. From a legal perspective,
this mechanism resembles insurance and may, depending on the jurisdiction,
fall within the scope of financial or insurance regulation.
Another frequent feature is early unbonding. While most protocols require
staked assets to remain immobilized for a fixed period—the bonding period—
some providers allow clients to withdraw their assets before the term expires.
In practice, the provider assumes the cost of maintaining liquidity or pre-fi-
nances the withdrawal, thereby creating a facility that is economically similar
to lending or liquidity transformation. For this reason, such services may also
attract regulatory scrutiny.
Providers may also propose alternative reward schedules, departing from
the protocol’s native reward system. Rewards can be distributed at fixed inter-
vals, subject to smoothing mechanisms, or even guaranteed at a minimum level.
These arrangements, while convenient for users, alter the economic nature of
staking and may lead regulators to treat them as interest-bearing products or
investment services, with the consequent application of MiCA or national secu-
rities laws.

Staking services: taxonomy, risks and regulation 77
Finally, some providers offer aggregation services, whereby multiple hold-
ers can pool their assets in order to meet the minimum threshold required to
operate a validator node. This lowers barriers to entry and facilitates broader
participation in PoS networks. At the same time, however, it introduces legal
complexities: pooling arrangements may resemble collective investment struc-
tures and, under certain conditions, fall within the regulatory perimeter govern-
ing investment schemes or analogous categories.
Taken together, these ancillary services illustrate how staking has evolved
from a purely technical consensus mechanism into a complex ecosystem of lay-
ered offerings. Each such service modifies the risk allocation between user and
provider, and therefore requires careful, case-by-case, legal qualification to de-
termine whether it remains within the domain of unregulated activity or whether
it crosses into the scope of regulated financial, insurance, or investment ser-
vices.
Finally, for the sake of completeness, it is worth mentioning a further model
known as liquid staking. Liquid staking constitutes an evolution of traditional
staking arrangements, as it enables token holders to delegate their assets to val-
idators while simultaneously receiving derivative tokens that remain transfera-
ble and tradable on secondary markets. This mechanism enhances market li-
quidity and capital efficiency, but at the same time raises complex regulatory
challenges. On the one hand, it blurs the line between staking services and in-
vestment products, potentially triggering the application of securities law or col-
lective investment scheme regulation whose application will be fostered by the
“protocol” nature of the entity issuing the tokens. On the other hand, it entails
additional risks, such as the volatility of derivative tokens, rehypothecation
practices, and systemic concentration around a limited number of large liquid
staking providers. The legal qualification of these arrangements therefore re-
quires careful scrutiny, both under financial markets regulation and within the
framework of consumer protection law.
4. Risks taxonomy
When constructing a taxonomy of the risks associated with staking activities,
it is possible to distinguish, at a minimum, between two categories: (i) risks for
the individual holder and (ii) risks for the ecosystem as a whole
13
.
13
According to FINMA, cit., another risk is the “Market risk, as it may not be possible to sell
staked cryptoassets at the right time in a volatile period if the unstaking process includes a lock-
up/exit, creating a delay in returning blocked cryptoassets”. This risk, however, will not be fur-
ther addressed here, since it cannot be effectively mitigated through regulation of staking

78 Salvatore Luciano Furnari
The first category concerns the relationship between the holder and the pro-
tocol (in the case of solo staking), or among the holder, the protocol, and the
intermediary (in the case of delegated or custodial staking). Within this domain,
the primary risk is the classic risk of intermediation: information asymmetry. In
solo staking, asymmetry is less pronounced, since the “intermediary” is the pro-
tocol itself, and thus any asymmetry derives “just” from the complexity of the
underlying code. Nevertheless, such technological asymmetry is not negligible,
as most holders lack the expertise to fully scrutinize or audit the protocol’s gov-
ernance rules.
By contrast, in delegated or custodial staking, the asymmetry vis-à-vis the
protocol is reduced by the expertise of the intermediary offering the service. Its
involvement in the process can reduce the transaction costs associated with par-
ticipating in validation activities—costs that would otherwise fall directly on
the individual holder—thereby broadening and democratizing access to proto-
col rewards. On the other hand, the presence of an intermediary brings to the
table moral hazard and so a counterparty risk.
This risk is particularly pronounced in custodial staking, where the holder
relinquishes direct control over the staked crypto-assets. In such cases, the
solvency, reliability, and integrity of the intermediary become decisive fac-
tors, and the holder is exposed to the risk of mismanagement or even misap-
propriation.
In solo staking, by contrast, counterparty risk coincides with the risk of tech-
nical failure: the only “counterparty” is the protocol, an automated system with
no discretion, which reduces, but does not eliminate, risks.
Delegated staking occupies an intermediate position: although the holder re-
tains control of his crypto-assets, reliance on a validator still entails exposure to
operational or reputational risks stemming from the intermediary’s software ro-
bustness.
Turning to risks for the ecosystem, it must be recalled that staking lies at the
core of the crypto-asset market. The degree of concentration of validator nodes
has systemic implications. If holders are disincentivized from solo staking, and
only a limited number of intermediaries provide delegated or custodial services,
there is a tangible risk of oligopolistic concentration. Such a scenario under-
mines decentralization and increases the vulnerability of the network to collu-
sion or capture.
The risk of oligopoly is further amplified by contractual clauses in staking
agreements, particularly those concerning governance rights—that is, who has
the authority to make decisions regarding the staked crypto-assets. The greater
services. Rather, the requirement that crypto-assets remain locked for a certain period should be
regarded as a core structural feature of the staking mechanism itself.

Staking services: taxonomy, risks and regulation 79
the concentration of such governance powers in the hands of a small number of
intermediaries, the greater the systemic fragility of the ecosystem as a whole.
5. Legal and regulatory analysis
In general terms, staking is primarily a technical process, and the provision of
staking services may be conceptualized as the supply of a technological service.
Regulatory concerns, however, may arise where the offering of staking is
coupled with additional features that alter its economic and legal profile. Three
situations are particularly noteworthy. The first is when staking is marketed to-
gether with promises of returns unrelated to the rewards generated by validation
activity. The second is when the service is structured in a manner that approxi-
mates fund management, for instance by pooling assets under discretionary con-
trol of the provider. In both cases, the providing of staking could acquire the
economic characteristics of a regulated financial service. The third, already dis-
cussed above, is the case of custodial staking where a MiCAR license as custody
service provider is required before offering the service to the public.
Solo staking and delegated (non-custodial) staking, are not regulated ser-
vices. This is true both from a financial (i.e. under MiFID
14
) or “crypto” (i.e.
under MiCAR
15
) point of view. This approach finds confirmation, first, in the
structure of the MiCAR. Notably, MiCAR does not expressly mention staking
among the regulated crypto-asset services. The only activity that could conceiv-
ably be connected (but it is not) to staking under MiCA’s taxonomy is the trans-
fer of crypto-assets, but this is ancillary and does not capture the essence of
staking itself. The absence of a specific reference to staking suggests that the
European legislator did not consider it, in its pure technical form, as falling
within the perimeter of financial services regulation.
Indeed, the European regulator has expressed its clear opinion on staking
service through ESMA Q&A no. 2067 of the 9
th
January 2024. To the specific
question “Does MiCA prohibit staking-related services or are staking activities
exempt from the application of MiCA?”, the European Commission intervened,
answering that “MiCA does not contain provisions specific to staking. It does
not therefore prohibit staking, and staking as such is not subject to specific re-
quirements or licensing”. But the Authority also clarified that when the service
14
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on
markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU
(recast) Text with EEA relevance.
15
Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May
2023 on markets in crypto-assets.

80 Salvatore Luciano Furnari
is provided by an intermediary that controls the private keys of the user, then
“The provision of staking services therefore requires that the crypto asset stak-
ing service provider is authorised under MiCA to provide custody and admin-
istration of crypto-assets on behalf of clients”. In this respect, the Authority also
clarify that in custodial staking, the risk of slashing or other loss of crypto-assets
connected to the behaviour of the intermediaries, should be borne by the inter-
mediaries themselves. This clear statement puts some doubt on the validity of
clauses providing the contrary. An additional important clarification given by
the Authority is that CASP offering custodial services, need the express consent
of the users “to stake their crypto-assets, as it may have an impact on their
clients’ ability to access them”
16
.
While the European regulator limited its intervention to a Q&A, US and
Swiss authorities have issued two dedicated statements on this topic.
In particular, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a
statement on 29 May 2025 clarifying that staking activities—whether in the
form of solo, delegated, or custodial staking—do not constitute an offer or sale
of securities under the Securities Exchange Act.
Applying the Howey Test, the SEC emphasized the absence of the criterion
known as the “efforts of others”. According to the authority, the activity of the
node operator is characterized as an administrative or “ministerial” activity of
the protocol. This is insufficient to satisfy the entrepreneurial or managerial ef-
fort required under Howey. In particular, the SEC stated that “rewards are pay-
ments to the Node Operator in exchange for the services it provides to the net-
work rather than profits derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts
of others”. This reasoning firmly distances staking rewards from the concept of
“investment profits”, anchoring them instead in the logic of technical service
provision
17
.
FINMA, the Swiss Financial Market Authority, issued an even less recent
statement in December 2023. Here, FINMA focuses on the relationship between
banking license and staking services. In particular, FINMA states that a banking
license is required for staking services in two particular scenarios. The first one
is when crypto-asset are held in a collective custody but are not “held in readi-
ness at all times” for the customer
18
. The second hypothesis is when crypto-
assets are held in collective custody without clear customer shares
19
. This raises
16
ESMA Q&A, No. 2067 of the 9
th
January 2024.
17
Although the SEC has expressly taken a position with regard to staking, the principles
articulated could in the future be extended to the provision of financial services by decentralised
protocols.
18
FINMA, cit., 6.
19
FINMA, cit., 6.

Staking services: taxonomy, risks and regulation 81
the risk that staking, when combined with custody or collective arrangements,
could approximate regulated financial services, especially where the intermedi-
ary exercises discretionary control over pooled assets.
6. Future evolutions and future research
The field of staking remains relatively nascent, and it can be reasonably an-
ticipated that new practices—both technical and contractual—will continue to
emerge as the market matures. The rapid pace of technological development in
blockchain networks, combined with the commercial incentives of intermediar-
ies, suggests that novel staking models, including variations of delegated or
pooled staking, will proliferate. Each of these models may raise distinct legal
and regulatory questions, particularly with regard to the allocation of risks and
responsibilities among the parties involved.
Given that staking offers the prospect of relatively stable returns coupled
with comparatively low risk, the sector may become increasingly attractive to
institutional investors managing substantial pools of savings. Such investors
typically operate under strict prudential and conduct requirements. Should in-
stitutional participation materialize on a significant scale, the legal qualification
of staking arrangements will demand closer scrutiny, as supervisory authorities
may be called upon to assess whether such activities fall within the perimeter
of regulated investment services.
Future research could therefore focus on the precise nature of the relation-
ship between intermediaries and users, exploring whether such relationship is
to be construed in purely civil law terms (mandate, deposit, or service contract)
or whether it assumes the features of an investment relationship subject to fi-
nancial regulation. This line of inquiry is crucial, as the contractual qualification
adopted may have far-reaching implications for liability, risk distribution, and
the applicable supervisory regime.
Moreover, as staking services become more widely accessible to retail cli-
ents, consumer protection law is likely to emerge as a further field of inquiry.
Issues such as the transparency and comprehensibility of contractual documen-
tation, the disclosure of technological and market risks, and the enforceability
of contractual terms in the event of slashing or network failure will acquire in-
creasing significance. The asymmetry of information between professional
staking service providers and retail clients underscores the importance of devel-
oping adequate safeguards.
In conclusion, staking epitomises the broader regulatory challenge posed by
decentralised finance: how to adapt legal frameworks designed for traditional,
person-based intermediaries to services that are technologically driven and

82 Salvatore Luciano Furnari
often lack a clearly identifiable operator. Addressing this challenge will require
not only legal scholarship, but also interdisciplinary collaboration, so as to in-
tegrate perspectives from economics, computer science, and financial practice
into a coherent regulatory approach.